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ABSTRACT: This article validates the Regional Authority Index with seven widely used 
decentralization indices in the literature. A principal axis analysis reveals a common structure. The 
major source of disagreement between the Regional Authority Index and the other indices stems from 
the fact that the Regional Authority Index does not include local governance whereas most other indices 
do. Two other sources of disagreement concern the treatment of federal versus non-federal countries, 
and countries which have recently regionalized and/or have asymmetrical regions, whereby the more 
fine-grained Regional Authority index captures greater variation. The second part discusses content 
validity of fiscal indicators.  
 
  
INTRODUCTION  
 
The purpose of this article is to validate the Regional Authority Index. One could distinguish 
between two reasons for assessing (internal) validity of measurements. First, by validating 
measurements, commonalities come to the fore. In how far do the measures measure the same? 
This is how assessing (internal) validity is usually understood. Another reason, however, may 
lie in exploring differences between measurements. When do measures of the same concept 
disagree? The answer to this question reveals information which might be helpful in deciding 
when or how to use one or the other measurement. In this article the validity of the Regional 
Authority Index is assessed by looking at the commonalities as well as the differences between 
the Regional Authority Index and other, widely used, regionalization and decentralization 
indices.  
 
Three types of indices exist: indices measuring institutional decentralization/ regionalization, 
indices of fiscal decentralization/ regionalization or indices that combine institutional and 
fiscal components. Institutional indices have been developed by Mohammad Arzaghi and J. 
Vernon Henderson (2005), Dawn Brancati (2006), Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2001), Jan-
Erik Lane and Svante Ersson (1999), Arend Lijphart (1999) and Daniel Treisman (2002). 
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Fiscal indices have been introduced by Dietmar Braun (2000), Frank Castles (1999), Dan 
Stegarescu (2005a), Jean-Philippe Meloche, François Vaillancourt and Serdar Yilmaz (2004), 
Robert Ebel and Serdar Yilmaz (2002), Ruben Enikolopov and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (2007), 
and Wallace Oates (1972). Some authors combine the two types into one index, as does Jaap 
Woldendorp, Hans Keman and Ian Budge (2002).  
 
Despite the abundance of indices, there is little systematic comparison of their validity (an 
important exception is Rodden (2004)). This article focuses on two types of validity (Ray 2007; 
Bollen 1989)1:  
 
Convergent validity assesses whether a given indicator is empirically associated with other 
indicators that conform to theoretical expectations: it involves comparing alternative measures 
of the same concept or comparing measures of different concepts (Ray 2007: 12). 
Measurements of the same concept, in our case, decentralization, should converge, that is, 
they should correlate across a given set of cases.  
 
Content validity assesses the degree to which an indicator captures the content of the measured 
concept (Adcock and Collier 2001: 537). This is a “qualitative type of validity where the 
domain of the concept is made clear and the analyst judges whether the measures fully 
represent the domain” (Bollen 1989: 185). Testing for content validity “does not involve the 
comparison of a measure with any other quantitative data, and can be employed even before 
any data is collected” (Ray 2007: 12). Content validity means that scholars agree on the 
definition of decentralization, or agree on how decentralization can be broken down into 
different types of decentralization. The measurements may differ in their ‘content’ because 
different theoretical assumptions underly them.  
 
I assess convergent validity for the Regional Authority Index by comparing the index with 
seven institutional-type regionalization and decentralization indices commonly used in the 
literature. I do not use fiscal indices to examine convergent validity of the Regional Authority 
Index because there are major caveats with respect to content validity. I point out two caveats 
with conceptualizing and operationalizing fiscal decentralization.  
 
In the next section, I introduce and compare seven institutional measures. Can 
decentralization be conceived as a single, continuous dimension? What is the common 
structure underlying these measures? I then test several hypotheses for explaining variation 
among the different measures, and I analyze the strongest cases of disagreement in greater 
detail. In the last section, I examine the content validity of fiscal indicators of decentralization.  
 
DECENTRALIZATION INDICES  
 
I conceive of decentralization as a single, continuous dimension ranging from centralization in 
which the central government monopolizes decision-making authority to decentralization in 
which subnational governments have extensive decision-making authority that falls short of a 
monopoly over authority. It is important to note that this is a simplification. Some authors 
differentiate among vertical vs. horizontal decentralization, or decentralization with respect to 
decision-making, appointment, electoral, fiscal or personnel (Treisman 2002), or between 
fiscal, political and administrative decentralization (Schneider 2003).  
 
The Regional Authority Index is consistent with these understandings in that it too is 
composed of different components: institutional depth, policy scope, fiscal autonomy, 
representation, and law making, executive control, fiscal control and constitutional reform. 
However, the Regional Authority Index differs from some (but not all) indices in that it 
focuses on regional tiers, i.e. the intermediate tiers with a minimum average jurisdictional 
population size of 150,000. Several decentralization indices that I discuss here consider the 
dispersion of power across all subnational tiers, thus including the local tier, and sometimes 
they also include dispersion of power to interests groups (i.e. corporatism).  
 
I compare the Regional Authority Index with the following indices:  
 
Arzaghi and Henderson (2005)2  
 
These authors present a “nuanced index of ‘institutional‘ decentralization, or effective 
federalism” (Arzaghi and Henderson 2005: 1176) which they construct by assessing fiscal, 
political, and administrative responsibilities of subnational government. This index is an 
average of six indicators, each of which ranges from 0 to 4:  
 Unitary (0) or federal (4) government structure;  
 Election of a regional executive: no (0) or yes (4);  
 Election of a local executive: no (0) or yes (4);  
Ability of the center to suspend lower levels of government or to override their 
decisions: no (4) or yes (0);  
 Revenue raising authority of lower level governments: no (0), limited (2) or full (4);  
 Revenue sharing: no (0), limited (2) or full (4).  
The dataset consists of scores for five-year intervals between 1960−1995 for 16 European and 
OECD countries that overlap with the Regional Authority Index dataset.3  
 
Brancati (2006)  
 
This index measures political decentralization, which is understood as the vertical division of 
authority among subnational levels of government that have independent decision-making 
power over at least one issue area.  
The index consists of three components, which together construct a scale ranging from 0 to 5:  
 Subnational elections: 1 point when there are subnational elections;  
 Subnational legislative control over policies: 1 point each for: tax authority, education 
and public order/police;  
 Subnational veto over constitutional amendments: 1.  
 
The dataset consists of 40 European, Balkan and OECD countries4, for the years 1985−2000.5  
Hooghe and Marks (2001)  
The Hooghe and Marks index is the only of seven which focuses on regional autonomy –rather 
than decentralization– within a country. This is an additive index of four components, ranging 
between 0 and 12:  
• Constitutional federalism (0-4), which taps constitutional or legal provisions relating to 
regional government in the state. One point is assigned for each of the following 
characteristics (Hooghe and Marks 2001: 194):  
o Existence of a functioning regional tier of government;  
o Extensive authoritative competencies, including control over two or more of the following: 
taxation; police; education policy (including tertiary education); cultural policy; transport and 
communications policy; economic development; local government; and determination of 
regional political institutions (e.g., administrative hiring, budget process, timing of regional 
elections);  
o Specific regional competencies that are constitutionally guaranteed;  
o A federal state in which constitutional change is co-decided by the central state and regions.  
 
• Special territorial autonomy (0-2), which refers to constitutional or legal provisions for home 
rule in special territories. The score is derived by multiplying the score for the extent of 
authoritative competencies in a special territory with a score that varies by the relative 
population size of the special territory, so that larger special territories weigh more heavily on 
the country score (Hooghe and Marks 2001: 200):  
Scope of competencies:  
o 0.5 = weak competencies;  
o 1 = extensive competencies (see the list above).  
Population coverage:  
o 1 = less than 10 percent of the population;  
o 2 = more than 10 percent of the population.  
• Role of regions in central government (0-4), whereby the authors distinguish between 
legislative and executive power sharing:  
Legislative power sharing, if there is a chamber in the national legislature composed of 
representatives of regional governments or parliaments:  
o 0 = no chamber in the national legislature composed of representatives of regional 
governments or parliaments;  
o 1 = chamber without wide-ranging veto power;  
o 2 = chamber with wide-ranging veto power.  
Executive power sharing:  
o 0 = no regular intergovernmental meetings between central state and regional 
executives;  
o 1 = regular meetings without authority to reach binding decisions;  
o 2 = regular meetings with authority to reach binding decisions.  
Regional elections (0-2):  
o 1 = the regional assembly is indirectly elected;  
o 2 = the regional assembly is directly elected.  
The dataset covers 14 West-European countries6, with for each country four time-points of 
evaluation: 1950, 1970, 1990 and 2000.  
 
Lane and Ersson (1999)  
 
This is an index of decentralization which is understood as “the territorial location of public 
decision and implementation functions at various levels of government” (Lane and Ersson 
1999: 207).  
The index consists of four discrete components for a total of 10 points:  
 Extent of federalism (0-3);  
 Special territorial autonomy (0-2);  
 Functional autonomy (0-2);  
 Local government discretion (0-3).  
The dataset contains scores for 18 West-European countries7, and has one data point capturing 
decentralization in the post-Second World War period8.  
 
 
 
Lijphart (1999)  
 
Lijphart measures federalism and decentralization which he conceives as one dimension. The 
index consists of five ordinal categories which construe a scale that ranges from 1 to 5:  
 1= unitary and centralized;  
 2= unitary and decentralized;  
 3= semi-federal;  
 4= federal and centralized;  
 5= federal and decentralized.  
This dataset consists of 36 countries, of which 24 West-European and OECD countries overlap 
with the Regional Authority Index.9 There is one score which is an average evaluation of the 
post-Second World War period.10  
 
Treisman (2002)  
 
Treisman focuses on decentralization, and he measures different types: vertical, decision-
making, appointment, electoral, fiscal and personnel decentralization.11 Decision-making 
decentralization comes closest to the definition of decentralization used in this article, and I 
therefore use it to validate the Regional Authority Index.  
An index of decision-making decentralization can be made by summing three components of 
decentralization identified by Treisman, which creates a scale ranging from 0 to 312:  
Weak autonomy = 1: the constitution reserves to subnational legislatures the exclusive right to 
legislate on at least one specific policy area or if subnational legislatures have residual 
authority;  
Residual autonomy = 1: the constitution gives subnational legislatures the exclusive right to 
legislate on policy areas not specifically assigned in the constitution;  
Subnational veto = 1: there is a regionally-elected upper chamber that has the constitutional 
right to block legislation.  
The dataset covers 41 European, Balkan and OECD-countries13, and the scores reflect the 
situation in the mid-1990s.  
 
Woldendorp, Keman and Budge (2000)  
 
Their autonomy index measures “how independent the non-central units of government are 
as regards policy making” (Woldendorp et al., 2000: 35).  
The autonomy index consists of four components, which combine in a scale from 0 to 8.  
Central fiscalization (0-2)14:  
2: if a country has a degree of fiscal centralization lower than 75%;  
1: if a country has a degree of fiscal centralization between 75% and 90%;  
0: if a country has a degree of fiscal centralization equal to or more than 90%.  
Regional autonomy (0-2):  
2: if regional autonomy is formally laid down (as is the case in federalist states);  
1: if the country is a semi-federalist system;  
0: neither.  
Centralization (0-2):  
2: if the state is not considered to be centralized;  
1: is the state is considered to be medium centralized;  
0: if the state is considered to be highly centralized.  
  
Local government autonomy (0-2):  
2: if three conditions are met: local government is mentioned in the constitution, its autonomy 
is recognized, and it is guaranteed own representation;  
1: if one of these conditions is met;  
0: all other cases.  
The dataset contains 37 European, Balkan and OECD-countries15, and there is one time-point 
of evaluation which reflects the post-Second World War period.16  
 
Factor analysis  
To see whether these diverse measures of a single concept −decentralization− have a common 
structure, a principal axis analysis is employed (Marks et al. 2007).17 Since the number of 
countries for which we have scores differs per decentralization index, I perform four separate 
factor analyses so that I can maximize the number of cases.   The factor analyses in Table 1 
reveal that the indices do indeed have a common structure. In each analysis, the principal axis 
has an eigenvalue well above one, and the explained variance is 75% or more. The Regional 
Authority Index measure loads strongly on the principal axis in all four analyses. Lijphart’s 
and Hooghe and Marks’, and to a lesser extent Brancati’s and Treisman’s measure also load 
heavily on the principal axis.  
SOURCES AND CASES OF DISAGREEMENT  
 
In this section, I explore the sources of disagreement between the decentralization indexes and 
I pay close attention to the most important cases of disagreement. The decentralization indices 
can be considered as expert judgments. As can be seen from the description of the indices, 
each expert uses her/his own criteria. Although there are commonalities in these criteria, there 
are also many differences. Furthermore, experts differ in their level of knowledge for different 
countries. One may hypothesize that this all leads to different evaluations of subnational 
autonomy in countries.  
 
Sources of disagreement  
To explore the structure of disagreement between the Regional Authority Index and the other 
measures, the Regional Authority Index is regressed on each decentralization index.18 By 
exploring the residuals from regressing the Regional Authority Index on one of the other 
decentralization indices one can see when the measures disagree. I am interested in systematic 
sources of bias or error −not in random error. Where can we expect to observe larger residuals, 
that is to say, where can we expect the scores of the Regional Authority Index to differ 
systematically from those of one of the other indices?  
 No regional tier  
One major difference between the Regional Authority Index and all but one of the alternative 
seven indices is that the Regional Authority Index only captures intermediate regional tiers, 
not local government. The Regional Authority Index also excludes regional tiers with an 
average population size below 150,000 people. Six of the seven other indices consider local as 
well as regional government in assessing decentralization. So the Regional Authority Index is 
designed to measure regional government, and this, one would expect, is somewhat 
conceptually distinct from decentralization, which the other indices measure.  It seems 
reasonable, then, to expect negative residuals for countries which have only one subnational 
government tier, which are countries with local government only. That is to say, the Regional 
Authority Index should under-estimate decentralization in countries that have only a local 
tier.  
  
  
 
Federal versus non-federal countries  
 
The fine-grained character of the Regional Authority Index allows for capturing graduations 
in the extent of regional autonomy − even in countries with highly autonomous regions, such 
as federal countries. This is different from most indices, which usually employ a sharply 
discontinuous measure, sometimes simply dichotomous, that distinguishes federal from non-
federal countries. Lijphart, for example, assigns all federal countries a score of 5 whereas only 
Austria scores a 4.5. All federal countries, except Austria, thus receive the highest score while 
non-federal countries are allowed to have more differentiated scores (between 1, 2, and 3).  
The Regional Authority Index is more sensitive to variation within the federal category: the 
range among federal countries is 14, from about 17 (Austria and the Russian Federation) to 
almost 30 (Germany) up to about 31 (Bosnia and Herzegovina). This range is about the same 
as it is for non-federal countries which vary between 0 (multiple countries) to about 14 (the 
Netherlands and Sweden).  
 
Other indices, however, work exactly the opposite way: they tend to treat the non-federal 
countries more as a homogenous group and allow more variation among the federal countries. 
Treisman’s measure, for example, gives only six out of 33 non-federal countries a score higher 
than zero, whereas all eight federal countries score between 1 and 3.  
 
Differential sensitivity in measurement should produce systematic differences in scoring. That 
is to say, for some indices, such as Lijphart’s, one would expect the residuals with the Regional 
Authority Index to be larger for federal countries than for non-federal countries. Conversely, 
for other indices such as Treisman’s, the residuals should be smaller for federal countries and 
larger for non-federal ones.  
 
These different biases in scoring become apparent when one compares, for each index, means, 
standard deviations and ranges for federal with those for non-federal countries (see Table 2).  
  
 
 
All decentralization indices are able to differentiate between federal and non-federal countries, 
i.e. the mean score for non-federal countries is significantly different from the mean for federal 
countries.19 This means that all decentralization indices pick up between-group differences.  
But not all measures are equally suited to capture within-group differences.  
 
The ratio measure in Table 2 gives a sense of this. The ration is calculated by dividing the 
standard deviation of federal countries by that of non-federal countries. A ratio larger than 
one indicates that the decentralization index is biased to capturing variation among federal 
countries, a ratio smaller than one indicates the opposite. One can see that the Regional 
Authority Index, Arzaghi and Henderson and Woldendorp et al. differentiate equally between 
countries within each group. Hooghe and Marks and Lijphart tend to treat the federal countries 
as a homogenous group whereas Brancati, Lane and Ersson and Treisman tend to treat non-
federal countries as a homogenous group.  
 
One may expect differences in scoring to lead to negative residuals (underestimation by the 
Regional Authority Index) for federal countries for the Hooghe and Marks and Lijphart 
measures whereas it should lead to positive residuals (overestimation by the Regional 
Authority Index) for federal countries for the Brancati, Lane and Ersson and Treisman 
measures.  
 
 
 
 
Asymmetry and regionalizing  
A last source of disagreement might be expected for countries that, for some reason or 
another, are complicated to evaluate. This may be so when a country has asymmetrical regions 
which depart from the general country pattern, or when decentralization in a country has been 
in flux recently.  The vertical state structure is not necessarily uniform within a single country 
at a certain point in time and over time. A country might have a special autonomous region 
which has more autonomy than other subnational units, for example Grønland and the 
Færøerne in Denmark and Åland in Finland. There might also be differences between units of 
the same subnational tier. Examples are the historic communities versus the other autonomas 
communidades in Spain and the special statute regions versus the ordinary regions in Italy. 
Decentralization is a moving target. Subnational tiers may be created or abolished, autonomy 
may be deepened or revoked. In France, for example, the régions were institutionalized in 1964 
and over time were granted more autonomy. How scholars evaluate these differences at a 
certain point in time may differ, and this, one would expect, should lead to variation in 
scoring.  
 
Explaining disagreement  
 
Testing these expectations requires that disagreement is operationalized. I use as measure the 
residuals from regressing the Regional Authority Index on the other decentralization indices.  
The first two sources of disagreement −presence or absence of a regional tier and federal or 
non-federal− are operationalized as dummy variables.20 To measure asymmetry and dynamic 
regionalization, I construct an additive index (0-2), whereby I allocate a value of 1 to a country 
that has (had) asymmetric regions21, and a value of 1 to a the country that has experienced 
radical regionalization22 in the post-Second World War period. The Regional Authority Index 
is regressed on the decentralization indices and the residuals are subsequently regressed on 
the sources of disagreement variables.23 I begin by considering absolute residuals and than 
look at raw residuals (taking the sign into account).  
  
The absolute residual analysis in Table 3 shows that the sources of disagreement differ across 
decentralization indices. The strongest predictor of disagreement for Brancati and Treisman is 
the ‘no regional tier’ variable. The federal-non federal variable is effective in explaining 
disagreement with the Treisman index and the asymmetry/regionalized variable explains 
disagreement with the Lijphart variable. None of the factors appeared significantly associated 
with the residuals for Arzaghi and Henderson, Hooghe and Marks, Lane and Ersson , and 
Woldendorp et al..  
 
I repeat the same analysis for raw residuals and report the results in Table 4. The most striking 
result is that all beta-coefficients are negative for the ‘no regional tier’ variable which means 
that the Regional Authority Index systematically underestimates subnational autonomy of 
countries which have no regional tier.  
 
Cases of disagreement  
 
It is not only interesting to see what the sources of disagreement are but also whether 
disagreement is caused by certain countries. What are the outliers? I define a ‘case of 
disagreement’ as having a residual score of two standard deviations or more. Table 5 shows 
thirteen cases of disagreement involving nine countries.  The differences in scoring for Cyprus, 
Finland, Luxembourg and Macedonia can be explained by the fact that the Regional Authority 
Index does not measure local government while the other decentralization indices do. But the 
precise scoring of these cases still raises some questions.  
 
 
Cyprus and Luxembourg score 1 (out of 3) on the Treisman measure since the Constitution of 
these countries reserves to subnational legislatures the exclusive right to legislate in at least 
one specific policy area. For Luxembourg this is birth, marriage, and death certificates24 and 
for Cyprus it is town planning25. This kind of scoring leads to some curious bedfellows: 
Australia and Russia also score 1 on Treisman’s index, and yet it would be difficult to sustain 
that the states of Australia and the federacii subwekty in the Russian Federation have the same 
autonomy as the municipalities in Cyprus and Luxembourg. Treisman’s index, then, may not 
be discriminatory enough to tap the full range of variation in decentralization.  
 
A similar observation could be made for the Macedonian score on Brancati’s index. Macedonia 
scores 3 out of 5, because local governments have authority over taxation (+1) and education 
(+1) and they have an elected assembly (+1). However, the 1995 Law on self-government 
strongly curtailed these powers as Brancati notes herself.26 Macedonia’s score of 3 ranks on par 
with the regioni in Italy, the autonomas communidades in Spain, the Australian states, the 
Russian federal subjects and the Belgian Gemeenschappen/Regio’s.  
 
Woldendorp et al. give Macedonia a score of 4 (out of 7). The score reflects that local 
government is mentioned in the constitution in combination with independent rights and its 
own representative body (+2 points) and that fiscal centralization is lower than 75% (+2 
points). The latter part of the scoring is contested by several more recent studies which 
highlight the limited tax autonomy of Macedonian local governments. Woldendorp et al. 
measure fiscal centralization as “Central Government Revenues as a % of General 
Government” (2000: 32-38) which is for Macedonia 44% (meaning that the local governments 
collect 66% of general government revenue). Financial governmental data for Macedonia is 
hard to find but the new Law on Local Government Finance (2002) assigns the levy of various 
taxes on property to local government units together with 3% of the personal income tax and 
access to an equalisation fund equal to 3% of value added taxes (Davey 2004). Local 
governments share in government expenditures as a percentage of general government 
expenditures was 7% in 2003 (Davey 2004). In light of this data the scoring of Macedonia by 
Woldendorp et al. is questionable for the post-2000 period but appears plausible for the 1991-
1998 period (but see Todorovski 2001 for the late 1990s).  
 
The higher score for Finland for Woldendorp et al. has to do with the fact that the Regional 
Authority Index does not measure local government. Finland scores high on subnational 
autonomy, a component of the Woldendorp et al. measure, which brings it on par with the 
Scandinavian as well as with the federal countries. Unlike its Scandinavian neighbors, Finland 
had no significant regional (or county) level of government before 1993, which is why the 
Regional Authority Index underestimates decentralization in Finland but not in the other 
Scandinavian countries.  
 
A case where the source of disagreement lies in a different definition of the boundaries of the 
country is Serbia and Montenegro which is scored relatively lower on decentralization by 
Brancati than the Regional Authority Index. The main reason, it appears, is that Brancati 
focuses primarily on Serbia during 1985−2000, while the Regional Authority Index considers 
Serbia and Montenegro as a unit.27  
 
Three cases of disagreement concern differences in whether particular tiers are included or 
excluded.  
 
The first is Belgium, which Hooghe and Marks give a lower score than the Regional Authority 
Index in 1970 and in 1990. The main reason for this disagreement is that Hooghe and Marks 
focused on one government tier −the most autonomous tier at a given time point− rather than 
on all intermediate tiers. In 1970, the most autonomous tier consisted of the provinces, and by 
1990 −their next time point− it was the communities. The Regional Authority Index, on the 
other hand, evaluates all intermediate tiers of government present at any time point. Belgium 
is also a case of disagreement with the Brancati measure. The main reason is that Brancati also 
focused on one tier of government, namely the regions/communities but not the provinces. 
This results in a lower scoring by Brancati.  
 
A third case of divergence, also with the Hooghe and Marks measure, is Sweden which is 
scored higher by the Regional Authority Index in 1950 and 1970. Hooghe and Marks consider 
the county governments in the Scandinavian countries as local and do not include them 
because their measure concerns regional autonomy. Hooghe and Marks therefore do not 
include the län in Sweden whereas the Regional Authority Index does28, resulting in a lower 
scoring by Hooghe and Marks.  
 
The remaining disagreements cannot be reduced to the local government factor, to country 
definition or to inclusion/exclusion of particular tiers.  
 
A first and second case of divergence is Germany, which Lane and Ersson and Brancati score 
significantly lower on decentralization than the Regional Authority Index. Lane and Ersson 
give Germany 4 (out of 10), which places Germany at the same level as Denmark, Finland and 
the Netherlands. The main reason for this is Lane and Ersson’s unusually expansive 
operationalization of decentralization: not only does it include local governance (+3 for 
Denmark and Finland), but also functional, neo-corporatist autonomy (+2 for the 
Netherlands).  
 
Brancati scores Germany 3 (out of 5) as she estimates that the Länder do not have control over 
public order/police (-1) and constitutional amendments do not require Länder approval (-1). 
Both coding decisions are contestable. Public order/police is actually a concurrent power 
(Watts 1999 and Swenden 2006; this issue). On constitutional change, Länder approval of 
constitutional amendments is indispensable due to their dominance in the Bundesrat (this 
issue). Brancati does not measure shared power exercised via an upper chamber but the 
Regional Authority Index does.  
 
Another case of disagreement with the Brancati measure concerns Cyprus. Brancati scores 
Cyprus 3 out of 5, while the Regional Authority Index scores it 0. The disagreement lies in the 
operationalization of decentralization. Closer examination shows that Brancati includes 
consociational arrangements laid down in the Constitution which decentralize authority to the 
Greek and Turkish Communities while the Regional Authority Index excludes 
decentralization to non-territorial actors.  
 
A fourth and final case of disagreement is Poland which Arzaghi and Henderson score higher 
than the Regional Authority Index. The difference in opinion appears to be whether the central 
government has the ability to suspend or to override subnational decisions. According to 
Arzaghi and Henderson, the answer is no, and so Poland receives a score of 4 instead of 0 for 
this sub-indicator. The scoring of Poland seems to be incorrect. The highest regional tier, the 
wojedwództwa, have gained directly elected councils and more autonomy since the end of 
communism, but their decisions are still subject to central sanctioning (see the country profiles 
in this issue; Council of Europe 2000: 47-48 and Kowalczyk 2000: 228). Central control is even 
greater for the lower regional tier, powiaty, and for local government, the gminy, for which the 
central government has the right to override decisions and has the authority to suspend the 
councils (Council of Europe 2000: 46-51; Glowacki 2002: 113-114; Okraszewska and 
Kwiatkowski 2002: 201-202; Kowalczyk 2000: 222-228).  
 
CONTENT VALIDITY OF FISCAL INDICATORS  
 
Fiscal indicators are widely employed as an overall measure of decentralization (see for 
example Braun 2000; Castles 1999; Fisman and Gatti 2002; Lane and Ersson 1999; Oates 1972; 
and Stegarescu 2005b). These indicators are based upon two extensively used sources: the 
Governance Finance Statistics database by the International Monetary Fund and Historical 
and/or National Accounts and/or Revenue Statistics of the Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development. Many different operationalizations exist but the most broadly 
used operationalizations are the following:  
 a. subnational share of total government expenditures  
b. intergovernmental grant share (i.e. grants from higher tier governments) as a percentage of total 
subnational revenue  
c. subnational own revenue (i.e. revenues from taxes plus fees and levies) as a percentage of total 
subnational revenue  
d. subnational tax revenue share as a percentage of total subnational revenue  
e. subnational tax revenue share as a percentage of total government tax revenue  
 
One can categorize the different operationalizations in two broad classes: expenditure (a and 
b) and revenue (c, d and e) aggregate fiscal indicators. Both classes of fiscal indicators raise 
two main caveats/problems with respect to content validity. First of all, fiscal indicators do 
not differentiate very well between decision-making authority and the authority to 
implement29 and, therefore, cannot be used to measure subnational decision-making authority. 
The second caveat is that fiscal indicators do not measure effectively differences in subnational 
implementation powers.  
 
Caveat 1: Expenditure and revenue fiscal indicators fail to capture how much decision-making authority 
subnational governments have and do not differentiate between decision-making and implementation.  
 
To exemplify this caveat one may differentiate between regulatory policies and policies involving 
the direct expenditure of public funds (Majone 1994). This distinction helps us to tell apart policies 
with a direct bearing on the public budget, for example welfare state policies, from policies 
that are not expensive for government budgets but have considerable impact on society 
through the rules they impose, for example civil and criminal law. While the cost of 
expenditure programmes is borne by the public budget, the cost of most regulatory policies is 
borne by citizens and firms (Majone 1994).  
 
To the extent that regions have control over regulatory policies, expenditure fiscal indicators 
would tell us nothing about decentralization. Imagine two countries, one in which subnational 
governments have the authority to implement expenditure policies (country A) and one in 
which subnational governments have authority regarding regulatory policies (country B). An 
expenditure fiscal indicator will score country A higher than country B on subnational 
decentralization. However, it would be wrong to conclude that country A is more 
decentralized than country B or that subnational governments in country A are more 
autonomous than those in country B. In fact, subnational governments in country B might 
have much more autonomy than those in country A since regulatory policies have to capacity 
to affect society deeply.  
 
Fiscal indicators on the expenditure side are particularly problematic for capturing decision-
making decentralization, since it does not tell us whether the expenditure comes from 
conditional or unconditional grants, whether the central government determines how the 
money should be spent, whether it sets the framework legislation within which subnational 
governments implement, or whether −indeed− subnational governments spend the money 
autonomously (Akai and Sakata 2002; Breuss and Eller 2004; Ebel and Yilmaz 2002; Fisman 
and Gatti 2002; Panizza 1999; Sharma 2006).  
 
The argument can be shown empirically in a scatter plot of the Regional Authority Index 
against the subnational share of total government expenditure (see Figure 1). Subnational 
governments in Scandinavian countries have the same (or higher) shares of total government 
expenditures than their peers in federal countries. To conclude from this that Scandinavian 
countries are as decentralized as federal countries would be wrong. Subnational governments 
in Scandinavian countries have less decision-making authority over policies, less taxation 
power, and they do not enjoy power sharing.30 The national government decides policies and 
local and regional governments implement them (Rodden 2004).  
 
  
One could ‘correct’ the indicator for subnational share by looking at the share of 
intergovernmental grants (Akai and Sakata 2002; Breus and Eller 2004; Oates 1972; Stegarescu 
2005a). This indicator measures the amount of central government involvement in subnational 
provision of policies. Often a distinction is made between conditional (specific) and 
unconditional (general) grants, whereby it is generally assumed that central government 
involvement is higher with conditional grants (Shah 2007). A conditional grant ties 
expenditure to particular strings (conditions) imposed by the central government. But this 
does not solve the problem. Aside from data availability regarding unconditional and 
conditional grants (Rodden 2004), there is the problem that intergovernmental grants do not 
seem to differentiate between federal and non-federal countries (see Figure 2), as an One-way 
Anova analysis as regards to average (1972−2001) subnational intergovernmental grant share 
as a percentage of total subnational revenue bears out (N = 35; F: 0.50; p = 0.482)31.  
 
 
 
 
Fiscal indicators on the revenue side are not biased against direct expenditure or regulatory 
policies. But they generate their own problems of concept validity. Revenue fiscal indicators 
do not help us figure out whether authorities that can tax autonomously can also decide 
autonomously what to do with the money (Ebel and Yilmaz 2002; Marlow 1988; Martinez-
Vazquez and McNab 1997; Panizza 1999). While the revenue might be collected freely, it may 
have to be spent on policies laid down by the central government. There is no direct, 
theoretical or empirical, link between the authority to collect revenues and the authority to 
decide and implement policies.  
 
This is apparent in Figure 3 which plots the average Regional Authority Index score for 
1972−2001 against the subnational tax revenue as a percentage of total government tax 
revenue (averages for 1972−2001). The correlation is moderate and significant (r = 0.47, p < 
0.01, N = 36). But a closer look at individual countries reveals that Sweden and Denmark are 
ranked at the same level as the USA and, to a lesser extent, the Russian federation and 
Switzerland, all three of which are federations. The counties in Denmark and Sweden may set 
the rate of income tax within central government parameters (this issue). But it would be 
wrong to conclude that the subnational tiers in Sweden and Denmark have the same policy 
and institutional autonomy as their peers in the USA, the Russian federation and Switzerland.  
 
 
 
 
The fundamental difference between the subnational tiers in Sweden and Denmark and the 
constituent units in federal countries is that the central government retains full decision-
making rights regarding tax powers in the former −and can unilaterally change the rules if 
and whenever it so desires− while it is constitutionally bound to respect regional tax powers 
in the USA, Switzerland, and arguably even in semi-democratic Russia. Moreover, regional 
authorities in Sweden and Denmark have primarily administrative powers over a broad range 
of policies within a national legislative framework. In the USA, Switzerland and the Russian 
Federation subnational tiers have principal authority over a swathe of policies.32  
 
Caveat 2: Fiscal indicators do not necessarily measure differences in implementation authority.  
 
There are two reasons. First, one cannot differentiate whether observed differences in fiscal 
centralization are due to genuine decentralization or whether they reflect differences in 
political economy. The argumentation is given by Oates (1972, p. 199−200):  
 
“… even if there exists an identical allocation of functions among levels of government across two 
countries, their centralization ratios will generally differ if they do not have the same relative 
expenditure patterns on these functions. A country, for example, with an unusually large portion of its 
resources devoted to national defense will have, other things being equal, a relatively high degree of 
fiscal centralization. …. centralization ratios may differ because certain services provided publicly in 
one economy are provided in the private sector in another”  
 
Note that this argument applies to the Regional Authority Index too but that fiscal indicators, 
and especially direct expenditure policies, are vulnerable to this problem. In the Scandinavian 
countries, a large proportion of government expenditure is devoted to welfare state policies, 
and these are often provided by subnational governments. In market-liberal Anglo-Saxon 
countries, welfare state functions tend to be privatized. So a difference in political economy 
explains higher expenditure (and revenue) in Scandinavian countries than in Anglo-Saxon 
countries whereas the allocation of functions among levels of government might be identical. 
The Regional Authority Index is not wholly invulnerable to the risk of conflating expenditure 
with authority, but since it relies on legal documents to gauge the allocation of functions 
rather than fiscal data, it avoids this problem to some extent.  
 
Second, fiscal measures conflate whether an increase in fiscal numbers is the result of a shift in 
functions or resources between government tiers, or whether it simply reflects a change in the 
size of government activities (Stegarescu 2005a). An increase in fiscal decentralization might 
be due to a relative increase in either the volume or the range of public goods provided by 
subnational governments. In the former, authority has not increased; in the latter, it has. 
Imagine a country in which a subnational government provides unemployment benefits. If the 
following year the subnational government provides sickness pay as well as unemployment 
benefits, there will have been an increase in authority. This will coincide, presumably, with an 
increase in subnational expenditure share and/or in an increase in subnational tax share (to 
finance the increased expenditure). However, subnational expenditure (or revenue) could also 
have increased without an expansion of authority, for example, if unemployment had 
increased.  
 
CONCLUSION  
 
A comparison of the Regional Authority Index with seven decentralization indices in the 
literature shows a great amount of agreement. A single underlying factor accounts for about 
three-quarters of the variance. This is remarkable given the diverse ways of operationalizing a 
fluid concept such as decentralization.  
 
An analysis of residuals (by regressing the Regional Authority Index on the seven 
decentralization indices) shows that the most consistent source of disagreement comes from 
the fact that the Regional Authority Index focuses on regional government to the exclusion of 
local government, while most decentralization indices include local government. A second 
source of difference relates to the sophistication of the measures. The more fine-grained 
Regional Authority Index is able to capture greater variation among both federal and unitary 
countries than most decentralization indices. Finally, countries-on-the-move, which have 
undergone major regionalization/federalization in the post-Second World War period, and 
countries with asymmetrical regions tend to generate more diverse scores differ across 
decentralization indexes than countries with greater architectural stability.  
 
Finally, an analysis of the content validity of fiscal indicators examined the shortcomings of 
fiscal indicators as a measurement of subnational authority or decentralization. Two caveats 
were considered. First, fiscal indicators fail to capture  whether subnational governments can 
decide autonomously what to do with the money. Second, we cannot tell whether differences 
in fiscal decentralization are due to genuine political decentralization or due to differences in 
political economy and/or a change in the size of government activities. Their value as a proxy 
for decentralization appears therefore limited.  
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